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This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and 
allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be 
appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To 
this end, we develop a two stage game played by environmental regulator(s) and the 
polluting industries of two countries. Regulator(s) choose the amount of emission 
allowances to be issued and set the level of monitoring effort to achieve full 
compliance, while regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to 
be held. We identify various, possibly conflicting, spillovers among states in a 
decentralized setting. We show that cost advantage in favor of local regulators is not 
sufficient to justify decentralization. Nevertheless, cost differential in monitoring 
violations can imply lower emissions and greater welfare under a decentralized 
institutional setting than under a centralized one. However, while a better environmental 
quality under decentralization is a sufficient condition for higher welfare under the same 
regime, it is not also a necessary condition. 
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The degree of decentralization of public policies is a controversial topic. Indeed,
while the so called "principle of subsidiarity" claims that it would be better to
decentralize to the jurisdictional level which is closer to the preferences of con-
sumers and/or producers, in several circumstances environmental policies may
represent important exceptions to this principle (Oates [14]). This paper deals
with this issue with a specic focus on emissions trading. More specically we
want to assess to what extent the powers of monitoring compliance and allocat-
ing permits within a federation of states should be centralized or delegated to
the single states.
Under this respect the implementation by the European Union of a trading
system for Greenhouse Gases emissions, as a step towards the achievement of
the Kyoto targets (Directive 2003/87/CE) represents an important evidence of
a decentralized emission trading system (ETS). Indeed, according to the Direc-
tive, permits are traded at the Union level, but permits allocation and moni-
toring duties are left to single member states. Such a decentralized structure
dierentiates the EU ETS from the more standard model of emission trading
characterized by a central environmental authority that a) xes a cap on total
emissions and issues a number of permits equal to the cap, and b) decides how
to monitor emissions sources in order to enforce full compliance or, at least,
minimize under-compliance1.
The innovative structure of the EU ETS has been attracting the growing
interest of environmental economists and some recent insights suggest, on both
the theoretical and empirical grounds, that under a decentralized ETS member
states tend to over-allocate permits (D'Amato and Valentini [5] and Ellerman
and Buchner [6]). Nevertheless, one could argue that the ineciency due to over-
allocation may be balanced if some monitoring cost advantage exists in favor
of single states2 The aim of this paper is indeed to investigate this eventuality.
Our results suggest that cost dierential in monitoring violations can imply
lower emissions and greater welfare under a decentralized ETS than under a
centralized one. Nevertheless we also show that cost advantage in favor of single
states' regulators is not sucient to justify decentralization.
To derive these results we use a two stage game played by environmental
regulators and polluting industries. Regulators move rst, choosing the emission
caps and, as in Malik [12], setting the level of monitoring eort to achieve full
compliance 3. We deal with a federation of two countries under two alternative
1As an example of a standard, centralized ETS we can think about the SO2 trading system
implemented in the US.
2This assumption can be justied on the basis of the better knowledge that local authorities
have concerning the willingness to comply by rms, as well as on the lower costs involved in
the use of existing monitoring personnel and facilities. See also [3], where decentralization is
justied, among other things, in terms of centralized diseconomies of scale in administration
and technical expertise.
3To assume full compliance is, in our view, close to actuality as, for example, the US SO2
trading system even achieved overcompliance (see Svendsen [16]) and, if we focus on the EU
ETS, the "...initial experience of the learning-by-doing phase of the scheme with respect to
1institutional frameworks, namely a centralized ETS, where there is a unique
federal regulator, and a decentralized ETS, where there are two local regulators
playing a "Cournot game", that is, each regulator chooses the emissions cap and
the monitoring eort taking other regulator's choices as given4. In the second
stage each rm observes the monitoring eort and the emission caps selected by
regulator(s) and chooses its emissions' level.
We nd that, under full compliance, emissions allocation in one country
causes a number of conicting spillovers to the other country that a decentral-
ized regulatory mechanism cannot internalize. Three spillovers are particularly
relevant: the rst one is dened in the paper as pollution spillover, causing
lower environmental quality and lower welfare in the other country; the sec-
ond is named enforcement spillover, causing higher environmental quality and
higher welfare in the other country; nally, we have a third, crucial spillover that
may cause opposite eects on environmental quality and welfare of the other
country depending on the sign of the asymmetry in monitoring cost between
the centralized regulator and the decentralized ones.
We conclude that environmental quality can be higher under decentraliza-
tion only if some monitoring cost dierential is accounted for. Indeed, when
there is no asymmetry between countries and between local and federal regula-
tors, the third spillover cancels out, the pollution spillover always prevail over
the enforcement one, and decentralization always leads to higher emissions and
lower welfare. Similarly, when the monitoring cost dierential is in favor of
decentralized regulators but it is not suciently high, yet a decentralized ETS
can be justied neither by environmental quality nor by a more general social
welfare analysis.
Environmental quality is higher under decentralization only if the monitoring
cost dierential is suciently high in favor of decentralized regulators. Never-
theless, for specic functional forms used to carry out some additional welfare
analysis, we show that a better environmental quality is not a necessary con-
dition for higher welfare under the decentralized ETS. As a matter of fact, it
may be the case that social welfare is higher under decentralization even if emis-
sions are lower under a centralized regulator. This shows that, under certain
conditions, a higher emissions level is not, by itself, proof that decentralization
of emissions trading is bad, as decentralization could be a good way to tackle
monitoring problems in a cost eective way. Indeed, the cost dierential may be
sucient to counterbalance the consequent higher environmental damage that
would arise under the decentralized ETS.
On the other hand, a better environmental quality under the decentralized
ETS is a sucient condition for higher welfare under the same regime. Indeed,
when the monitoring cost dierential is particularly high in favor of decentral-
ized regulators, decentralization features higher environmental quality which is
always coupled with higher welfare. This would be, of course the most favorable
case that could justify a decentralized ETS.
compliance and enforcement has been encouraging." (European Commission [7], [p.8])).
4In the paper we will discuss the implications of decentralization in a federal state, but our
results would hold unchanged if the focus were on an Economic Union.
2Two strands of the literature deal with questions which are closely related
to the issue analyzed in this paper. The rst one is related to the so called "en-
vironmental dumping" in both international (as in Barrett [1] and Ulph [17])
and federal settings (Ulph [18] and [19]). These papers show how national reg-
ulators attempt to relax environmental policy in order to secure to domestic
rms competitive advantages in international markets. Some more recent pa-
pers which are close in some sense to the "environmental dumping" literature
deals specically with emission trading. Among them Helm [9] analyzes the
allocation of emission permits under two alternative regulatory regimes, namely
with and without the possibility of trading permits. In his paper Helm nds
that the possibility of trading may induce more pollution since the higher num-
ber of permits chosen by environmentally less concerned countries may oset
the choices of the more concerned ones. In another paper, Boom and Dijkstra
[2] expand the analysis of Helm [9]. By including boundary solutions they show
that in some cases the results presented by Helm do not hold. Finally, D'Amato
and Valentini [5] show that a decentralized allocation of permits always results
in a lower than optimal price of permits, as well as in an aggregate emission
target which is larger than the socially optimal target that would arise under a
centralized solution. Our modelling strategy follows the one adopted by the en-
vironmental dumping literature, but regulator(s) do not only choose the amount
of allowances to be issued but also the level of monitoring and enforcement eort
to be devoted to discover and punish non compliant rms, as in the emission
permits enforcement literature.
The second strand of the literature to which our paper is strictly related is the
one on non-compliance under emission trading systems, starting with Malik [11]
and Keeler [10]. The authors examine the consequences of noncompliance for
a permits market, revealing that when rms are noncompliant permits markets
may not retain their eciency properties. In a subsequent work, Malik [12]
includes explicitly enforcement costs in the comparison among incentive based
policies and standard command and control instruments, and conclude that the
ranking among the two kinds of instruments is not obvious in such a setting.
These papers are then extended, among others, by Van Egteren and Weber [20],
Malik [13] and Chavez and Stralund [4] to account for the interaction among
the chance for non compliance and the presence of market power. We also
contribute to this strand of literature since, to our knowledge, this is the rst
attempt to investigate the consequences of decentralization when the choice of
enforcement eort is accounted for.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The main features of the
model are presented in the next section. Section 3 derives the solutions of
both the games dened under the decentralized and the centralized settings.
Section 4 presents a number of results based on some comparative statics. The
centralized and the decentralized regimes are compared in section 5 in terms of
both environmental quality and social welfare. Finally, section 6 concludes.
32 The model
We analyze a stylized model representing an Economic Union formed by two
countries labelled as A and B. In each country i (i = A;B) there are a large
number of identical rms. By normalizing to 1 the number of rms in each
country, we deal with one "representative" rm in each country (rm A and rm
B). We model two alternative institutional frameworks, namely a decentralized
emissions trading system (DETS) and a centralized one (CETS). Under the
DETS, we have a national environmental regulator in each country i (i = A;B)
while, under the CETS there is a single supranational regulator operating at
the Union level.
Before dening the interactions among the two rms and the regulator(s),
let us dene
 ei as the level of actual polluting emissions generated by rm i; pollution
is assumed to be uniformly mixing;
 ei as the initial endowment of permits received by rm i;
 qi as the level of allowed emission, that is the level of permits held by rm
i;
 vi = ei   qi as the level of violation that can be chosen by rm i. When
vi = 0 there is no violation and the rm is perfectly compliant, while, the
rm is non compliant whenever vi > 05;
 ui as the level of monitoring eort required to induce rm i to be fully
compliant;
 p is the price for permits resulting from a competitive market operating
at the Economic Union level.
The interactions among the two rms and the regulators are characterized by
the following two stage games of complete (but imperfect) information dened
separately for the (DETS) and the (CETS).
2.1 The two stage game under the DETS
First stage: Each regulator i (i = A;B) chooses the level of monitoring eort
(ui) in order to induce rm i to be fully compliant and the levels of emis-
sions permits allocated to rm i (ei) in order to maximize the national
social welfare
Wi = i    i   Di (1)
where i = A;B and
5We assume, without loss of generality, that overcompliance, that is vi < 0, never takes
place. In our simple model, any level of overcompliance would just imply the equilibrium
permits price to be driven to 0.
4 i is the expected prot of rm i that will be better dened at the
second stage;
  i =  i(ui) is the cost of monitoring rm i under decentralization,
with  0
i > 0 and  00
i > 0;
 Di = Di (e), is the damage to country i caused from the uniformly
mixed pollution e dened as e = eA + eB, and where dDi
de > 0 and
d
2Di
de2 > 0 (i = A;B).
Second stage: Each rm i (i = A;B) chooses actual emissions (ei) and per-
mits holding (qi) in order to maximize its expected prot
i = Bi   p(qi   ei)   Ni; (2)
where i = A;B and
 Bi = Bi(ei) is a strictly increasing and concave function of benets
deriving from emissions (excluding permits and ne payments);
 p(qi   ei) is the sum of money the rm spends (earns) if it is a net
buyer (seller) of permits where, given competitiveness in the permits
market, p is exogenously faced by rms.
 Ni = N(ui;vi) represents rm i's expected ne function6 which is
assumed to be increasing in the violation, i.e. @Ni
@vi > 0, and in the
degree of monitoring , i.e. @Ni






0; which is reasonable, in order for second order conditions to be
satised. Finally,
@N(ui;vi)
@ui@vi > 0; that is, the marginal increase in
expected penalty due to an increase in the violation increases with
monitoring eort.
It is worthwhile to note that the expected ne is a net transfer from the
rms to the regulator, then it can be omitted in the national social welfare
function (1).
2.2 The two stage game under the CETS
First stage: The centralized regulator chooses the levels of uA and uA in order
to induce rm A and rm B, respectively, to be full compliant, and the
levels of eA and eB required to maximize the aggregate social welfare
W = A + B   cA   cB   DA   DB (3)
where
6As in Malik [11] we assume that the rm is audited in an unexpected way and cannot
vary permits' holding after realizing.
7If we think about the expected ne as product of the ne times the audit probability,
then we can suppose that the audit probability depends on the degree of violation as well as
on the eort ui, and that the ne depends non linearly on the violation.
5 i is the expected prot of rm's i (i = A;B) that has been already
dened in section 2.1;
 ci = ci(ui) is the centralized regulator's cost of monitoring rm i,
with c0
i > 0 and c00
i > 0;
 Di = Di (e), is the damage caused from pollution to country i(i =
A;B) that has been already dened in section 2.1.
Also in the centralized case the expected ne is a net transfer....
Second stage: It is exactly the same as in section 2.1.
Of course, also under the CETS the expected ne is a net transfer from
the rms to the regulator. Then, it can be omitted also in the aggregate social
welfare function (3).
2.3 The market of permits
In this game the equilibrium price of permits is implicitly dened by the follow-
ing market clearing condition8:
qA + qB = eA + eB (4)
where the total amounts of permits held by the rms, on the left hand side,
and total endowment of permits allocated to the rms, on the right hand side,
represent the demand and the supply of permits respectively.
The demand side is dened by the conditions characterizing the optimal
choices of the rms in the second stage of the game while the supply side is
dened in the rst stage of the game when the environmental regulators choose
(at federal or national level) the amount of emission allowances to be issued to
the two "representative" rms, taking into account how rms will react in the
second stage. In so doing the regulators realize that the equilibrium price in
the permits market can be inuenced by their choice of ei (i = A;B), while
rms face an exogenous price p because they do not have market power in the
permits market.
3 The solutions of the games
In this section we rst solve the two games dened under the DETS and under
the CETS in order to characterize the price of permits under the two alternative
regulatory settings.
3.1 The solution of the game under the DETS
To determine the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game we proceed back-
ward. Therefore, we solve rst the rms' problem at the second stage of the
game and then the national regulators' problem at the rst stage.
8We limit our attention to the case of a strictly positive equilibrium permits price.
63.1.1 The rms' problem












In order to achieve full compliance, from conditions (5) and (6); the moni-






that is, the marginal ne corresponding to full compliance must be equal to the
permits price. The above condition implicitly denes uF
i (p):
3.1.2 The regulators' problem
Regulator i chooses the monitoring eort uF
i required to achieve full compli-
ance and the amount of allowances to be issued to domestic rms in order to
maximize:
Wi = i    i(uF
i )   Dd(ei + ej)
that is,
Wi = Bi(ei)   p(ei   ei)    i(uF
i )   Di(ei + ej) (8)
Taking the rst order conditions with respect to ei, and imposing
@Bi(ei)
@ei = p







































and the uniformly mixing pollutant assumption implies @Di
@ei = @Di
@ej , the above






































73.1.3 The price of permits
Solving (9) with respect to
@p
@ei(ei  ei); accounting that the equilibrium on the
permits market implies
@p
@ei(ei  ei) =  
@p
@ej(ej  ej) and substituting in (10) we
get, after some manipulation, the following condition for the equilibrium price
































3.2 The solution of the game under the CETS
Also for this game we have to proceed backward and solve rst the rms' problem
at the second stage of the game and then the centralized regulator's problem at
the rst stage.
3.2.1 The rms' problem
Since the second stage of this game is the same as the second stage of the game
under the DETS, the rms' rst order conditions w.r.t. ei and w.r.t. qi are,
again, (5) and (6) dened in section 3.1.1. The same holds for the condition
implicitly dening full compliance eort, given in (7):
3.2.2 The regulator's problem
The centralized regulator chooses emission allowances to be allocated to the
rms in the two countries in order to achieve full compliance and to maximize
(3). Under the CETS we can consider any permits revenue (cost) of rm i
(i = A;B) as an equivalent cost (revenue) of rm j (j = A;B, j 6= i). Therefore
we can rewrite (3) as follows:
W = Bd(eA) + Bf(eB)   cd(uF
d )   cf(uF
f )   Dd(eA + eB)   Df(eA + eB) (12)
By taking the rst derivative of (12) with respect to ei (i = A;B) and using




























3.2.3 The price of permits
By rearranging (13) we nally get the following condition, implicitly dening


























where pc is the equilibrium price of permits in a centralized setting.
84 Some comparative statics
In this section we derive some interesting comparative statics results, using the
conditions derived so far. Comparative statics with respect to the permits price
leads to the following:
Result 1 Both emissions and permits' holding decrease in the price of permits


















































Comparative statics with respect to the monitoring eort leads to the fol-
lowing:
Result 2 The level of actual emissions does not depend directly on the degree
of monitoring eort.



























This result is not really new in the literature. Indeed, both in Malik [11] and,
for the case of a rm facing emissions taxes, in Harford [8] the emissions' choice
is independent of the probability that the rm is monitored. Strandlund and
Dhanda [15], moreover, show that this independence extends also to the degree
of enforcement pressure. Our very general denition of Ni(vi;ui), however,
allows us to note that the independence from the monitoring eort (that may
be thought of as the result of an unspecied mix of both audit probability
and enforcement pressure) does not depend on the linearity of the expected
penalty in the monitoring eort, which is assumed by both Malik [11] and
Strandlund and Dhanda [15]. Result 2 does not imply that monitoring eort
cannot inuence actual emissions at all. Indeed, we can also show that
9Result 3 An increase in monitoring eort causes permits demand to increase
and the same happens to the equilibrium permits price.
Proof. Given
@N(ui;vi)











that, in turn, can be used to show that also the sign of
dp
dui is positive. The
equilibrium on the permits market implies:
qA + qB = e
























for any i = A;B.
Therefore, immediate corollaries of results 1 and 3 are that, as noted by
both Malik [11] and Strandlund and Dhanda [15], an increase in the monitoring
eort indirectly decreases actual emissions via its eect on the permits price,







Finally, we can investigate the relationship between emission allowances and
their equilibrium price. As it is standard, we get:
Result 4 An increase in the initial endowment of permits in any country causes
the equilibrium permits price to decrease.
Proof. Again, the equilibrium on the permits market implies:
qA + qB = e



















10for any i = A;B.
We can use the above results to investigate the consequences of the full




@p > 0: Combining
(7) and Result 4 we get to the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 An increase in allowances endowment in country i decreases
the eort needed both in country i and in country j to achieve full compliance.
Proof. Result 4 shows that
dp








In other words, the monitoring eort needed to achieve full compliance in-
creases (decreases) with the equilibrium price of permits (the aggregate emission
cap). This conclusion suggests the existence of a positive spillover among coun-
tries in a decentralized setting: an increase in the national cap in country i
implies a decrease in permits' price and, therefore, a decrease in the enforce-
ment eort needed to achieve full compliance in country j. The relevance of
such spillover will be discussed in the following sections.
5 Environmental quality and social welfare
Comparing the rst order conditions under decentralization with those arising














































1. The term  
@p
@ei(ej   ej) is due to the fact that an increase in the initial
allocation of permits in country i also decreases the equilibrium permits
price. If country j's "representative" rm is a net seller of permits, this will
cause a negative spillover on country j's welfare. If the "representative"
rm operating in country j is a net buyer of permits, this spillover will be
positive. The overall eect among the two countries cancels out, however,
because, when the permits market is in equilibrium, the positive spillover
in one country perfectly osets the negative spillover in the other. Such
spillover is therefore likely to have only distributional consequences.
2. The term  
@Dj
@ei captures a second spillover: this is an international exter-
nality that the choice of the environmental authority of country i causes
to country j. As we know, an increase in permits by any country leads
to an increase in emissions that will also damage the other country. How-
ever, it is worthwhile to note that this externality is a consequence of the
11permits' market per se, and it does not depend on the global nature of
the environmental issue we are dealing with. As a matter of fact, even
if the environmental damages of the two countries depended only on the
emissions generated within their borders an increase in ei would still bring
about more emissions in country j via the induced reduction in p. This
eect is discussed in detail by [5]. In the rest of the paper we will label

















@ei identies the consequences of any
asymmetry in enforcement costs among centralized and decentralized in-
stitutional scenarios. The consequence of an asymmetry in monitoring
costs will be addressed in the last part of the paper. This term disappears
if no cost dierential is assumed between centralized and decentralized
regulators.










@ei identies a positive spillover among countries,
already explained in Proposition 1: an increase in permits endowment in
country i leads to a decrease in equilibrium permits price and, therefore,
to a decrease in the amount of monitoring eort needed to achieve full
compliance, leading to a reduction in related costs. We call such spillover
enforcement spillover.
The net eect of the four spillovers is not obvious or straightforward. To
gain further insights, assume now that countries are symmetric. As uF
i = uF
j =








@ui in a decentralized setting, for (i = A;B). Further, assume that
the damage function is symmetric (i.e. Di(:) = Dj(:) = D(:)) and the same
holds for the benets function (i.e. Bi(:) = Bj(:) = B(:)): As a consequence,























The following result is, then, straightforward.
Proposition 2 If no asymmetry is introduced among countries and/or institu-
tional settings, then the positive enforcement spillover is always dominated
by the negative pollution spillover.
Proof. The result follows immeditely from either (15) and (16) and the
assumption of a strictly positive permits price.
It is not easy to get further readable insights; however, we can investigate
the consequences of decentralization if no cost advantage is assumed in favour
of a decentralized setting. More specically, assume that c(:) =  (:): We get
therefore to the following:
12Proposition 3 If no asymmetry is introduced among countries and/or insti-
tutional settings, decentralization per se always leads to higher emissions than
centralization.
Proof. Given our additional symmetry assumptions, we can rewrite the






































where the right hand side in (17) is strictly positive by Proposition 2, while in
(18) we accounted for the fact that under perfect symmetry there is no trading
of permits in equilibrium. As the left hand side of both (17) and (18) must be
decreasing in ei to ensure that the decentralized regulators problems are concave
problems, the proof is completed.
The last two results have relevant consequences on the choice betrween a
centralized and a decentralized setting. More specically, in a perfectly sym-
metric framework, the choice of a decentralized setting cannot be supported
either in terms of social welfare (which is of course higher by denition in a
centralized setting) or under an environmental quality point of view. Further,
Proposition 2 implies that, unless the permits price is driven to 0, full com-
pliance does not alter the presence of an "aggregate" negative spillover among
countries in a decentralized setting.
5.1 Asymmetry in monitoring costs
5.1.1 Model results
A symmetric setting is useful as a benchmark, and it allows to investigate all the
consequences of decentralization per se. As we demonstrated, when countries
are completely identical and there is no monitoring cost advantage favouring de-
centralization, the latter cannot be justied under any respect. So why should
we choose decentralization in the rst place? As already outlined in the in-
troduction, the answer to this question might depend on the relative ease in
monitoring and enforcement that might characterize countries belonging to an
Economic Union (or to a federation of States). In order to get readable insights
we need, however, to keep the symmetric countries assumption and to introduce
specic functional forms for costs, benets and social welfare functions.
We assume for country i (i = A;B) the following specic shapes for the
expected benets and expected ne functions:











F(qi   ei) + 1
2(qi   ei)2
for qi > ei
0 otherwise
where F is a positive constant representing the unit ne for noncompliance.
The quadratic term is related to the likely obligation of regulated rms to abate
excess pollution once found uncompliant.
The damage function for each country is quadratic and implies (coherently
with the assumption of symmetry among countries) that marginal damage is





Finally, the monitoring cost function is assumed to be linear in monitoring
eort, and is the only source of asymmetry among institutional settings. More
specically, under centralization:
c(:) = u;
while in a decentralized setting:
 (:) = du:
Using the above functional forms and solving the rms' and regulators' maxi-
mization problem we get the following values for aggregate environmental tar-
gets, equilibrium price of permits, monitoring needed to achieve full compliance
and social welfare (notice that, as before, subscripts c label values obtained in
a centralized setting, while d labels decentralization results10:
Centralized Decentralized
Emissions ec = 1
5F (2F + 2) ed = 1
3F (2F + d)
Price pc = 1
5F (4F   ) pd = 1
6F (4F   d)
Monitoring uc = 1
5F 2 (4F   ) ud = 1
6F 2 (4F   d)
Welfare Wc = 1
5F 2
 








In order to make comparisons easier, we assume the following relationship be-
tween centralized and decentralized monitoring costs:
 = d
where
10We do not go into the details of the numerical calculations, that are coherent with the
implicit calculations performed in the preceeding sections. All the details are available from
the authors upon request. Further, in order to guarantee that price of permits is not driven
to 0, we must assume that  < 4F:
14 when  2 (0;1) monitoring is more costly under decentralization, while
 when  2 (1;1) there is a cost advantage in favour of decentralized reg-
ulators.
The comparison of aggregate caps arising under centralization and in a de-
centralized setting leads to the following result:
e = ed   ec =
1
15F
(5d + 4F   6d)




(4F + 5d) = e
where it is easily shown that e > 1:
We can therefore state the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 A suciently high cost dierential in favor of the decentral-
ized regulators leads the aggregate cap to be higher under centralization. More
specically, in our modeling framework, we get the following two cases:
 if 0 <  < e then e > 0
 if  > e then e < 0:
The intuition for this result is as follows; when the cost dierential is very
high then the "dierential" incentive of the centralized regulator to decrease
permits price to achieve full compliance with lower monitoring eort is so strong
to counterbalance any negative spillover among countries related to emissions.
When the cost dierential is not very high, the opposite happens.
Turning to welfare comparison we get:
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It is easily shown that 2
W > e > 1
W > 1 and that 2
W > 4F
d : As a
consequence, we can never have the case that  > 2
W as it would imply a null
(decentralized) equilibrium permits price.
This leads us to the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 When centralization implies suciently higher monitoring costs
w.r.t. a decentralized setting, the latter results in a higher social welfare. More
specically
 W < 0 for  < 1
W
15 W > 0 for 1
W <  < 4F
d
Results in propositions 4 and 5 can be summed up in three possible cases:
1. W < 0 and e > 0 for  < 1
W
In this case the cost dierential is suciently low to keep emissions higher
in a decentralized setting. The cost advantage under decentralization is
not enough to counterbalance the related environmental damage in terms
of social welfare.
2. W > 0 and e > 0 for 1
W <  < E
In this case emissions are higher in a decentralized setting, but decentral-
ization also features a higher welfare. This could be the case because the
cost dierential is now higher in favour of a decentralized setting.
3. W > 0 and e < 0 for E <  < 4F
d
In this third case emissions are even higher under centralization. This is
the most favourable case for decentralization.
Notice, further, that d plays an important role in determining all the above
threshold values. Taking the rst derivative of e and 1























As a consequence, an increase in d reduces the threshold above which emis-
sions are higher in a centralized settingas well as the threshold above which
social welfare is higher in a decentralized setting.
Results obtained are coherent and add to those gained in section 4. A
number of lessons can be learned from our analysis:
 if no asymmetry among countries and/or institutional settings is intro-
duced, decentralization cannot be justied under any respect (social wel-
fare and/or environmental quality);
 the introduction of a monitoring cost dierential in favour of decentralized
regulators is a necessary but not sucient condition to provide support
to a decentralized ETS. Decentralization is only justiable if such cost
dierential is suciently high as to provide the centralized regulator with
relatively strong incentives to issue permits in order to drive the price (as
well as the monitoring eort) down.
16 An increase in decentralized (and, given , centralized) unit monitoring
costs implies all the thresholds dened above to shift down, leading to an
even less favourable situation for centralization. This is reasonable: when
 > 1 the incentive for the central regulator to issue permits in order to
drive full compliance monitoring down grows more rapidly than the same
incentive in a decentralized setting.
6 Conclusion
In the paper, we have addressed the consequences of decentralizing compliance
monitoring and permits allocation under emissions trading within an economic
union. Using a two stage game played by two regulators, and their respective
polluting industries, we identied various spillovers among countries arising un-
der decentralization.
Further steps for improving the study presented in this paper could be the ex-
tension of welfare analysis to a more general setting where no explicit functional
form is introduced, the removal of the symmetry assumptions among countries,
and the explicit modeling of the output market. Despite of these limits, by sim-
ply introducing the possibility of monitoring costs dierential between national
environmental authorities and a centralized one operating at the federal level
we have been able to show that decentralization is not necessarily an inecient
political choice. Indeed, high cost dierential in monitoring violations can imply
lower emissions and greater welfare under a decentralized institutional setting
than under a centralized one. This result is particularly relevant since it allows
to nd an economic justication for decentralization which is based on eciency
and not on other political arguments as in D'Amato and Valentini [5].
On the other hand, we have also seen that cost advantage in favor of na-
tional states is not sucient to justify decentralization. As a consequence, the
entity of possible cost dierentials (if any) should be carefully evaluated in or-
der to express any denitive judgement on the two alternative emission trading
regimes.
References
[1] Barrett, S. (1994), "Strategic environmental policy and international
trade", Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325-338.
[2] Boom J.-T., Dijkstra B. (2006), "The eect of emissions trading on inter-
national environmental agreemets", Unpublished manuscript, University of
Nottingham.
[3] Butler, Henry N. and J. R. Macey (1996), Using Federalism to Improve
Environmental Policy, American Enterprise Institute.
17[4] Chavez, C. and J. Stranlund (2003) \Enforcing Transferable Emission Per-
mit Systems in the Presence of Market Power." Environmental and Re-
source Economics, Vol. 25, Issue 1: 65-78.
[5] D'Amato A. and E. Valentini (2007). "Why so many tradeable emission
permits within the European Union?". I-Com WP 11/07, Istituto per la
Competitivita', Roma.
[6] Ellerman D., Buchner B. (2008), "Over-allocation or abatement? A pre-
liminary analysis of the EU emissions trading scheme based on the 2005-06
emissions data", Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 41, Issue 2:
267-287.
[7] European Commission (2006), "Report to the European Parliament and the
Council considering the functioning of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.",
COM(2006)676.
[8] Harford, J. D., "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution
standards and taxes"." Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment 5: 26-43.
[9] Helm, C. (2003). "International emissions trading with endogenous al-
lowance choices". Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2737-2747.
[10] Keeler, A. (1991) \Noncompliant Firms in Transferable Discharge Per-
mit Markets: Some Extension." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 21: 180-189.
[11] Malik, A. (1990) \Markets for Pollution Control when Firms are Noncom-
pliant." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 18: 97-106.
[12] Malik, A. (1992) \Enforcement Cost and the Choice of Policy Instruments
for Controlling Pollution." Economic Inquiry XXX: 714-721.
[13] Malik, A. (2002) \Further Results on Permits Markets with Market Power
and Cheating." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44:
371-390.
[14] Oates, W. E. (1999), "An essay on scal federalism", Journal of Economic
Literature, XXXVII, 1120-1149.
[15] Stranlund, John K. and K. Dhanda (1999), "Endogenous Monitoring and
Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System" Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management, 38, 267-282.
[16] Svendsen, G.T. (1998), "The US Acid Rain Program: Design, Performance
and Assessment", Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy,
16, 723-34.
18[17] Ulph A. (1996), "Environmental policy and international trade when gov-
ernments and producers act strategically", Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management, 30, 265-281.
[18] Ulph A. (1998), "Political institutions and the design of environmental pol-
icy in a federal system with asymmetric information", European Economic
Review, 42, 583-592.
[19] Ulph A. (2000), "Armonization and optimal environmental policy in a fed-
eral system with asymmetric information", Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management, 39, 224-241.
[20] Van Egteren, H. and M. Weber (1996) \Marketable Permits, Market Power
and Cheating." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30:
161-173.
19NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2008 
CCMP 1.2008  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Emanuele Massetti: Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and 
Distributional Effects 
CCMP 2.2008  Ruslana Palatnik and Mordechai Shechter: Can Climate Change Mitigation Policy Benefit the Israeli Economy? 
A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis 
KTHC 3.2008  Lorenzo Casaburi, Valeria Gattai and G. Alfredo Minerva: Firms’ International Status and Heterogeneity in 
Performance: Evidence From Italy 
KTHC 4.2008  Fabio Sabatini: Does Social Capital Mitigate Precariousness? 
SIEV 5.2008  Wisdom Akpalu: On the Economics of Rational Self-Medication 
CCMP 6.2008  Carlo Carraro and Alessandra Sgobbi: Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Strategies In Italy. An 
Economic Assessment 
ETA 7.2008  Elodie Rouvière and Raphaël Soubeyran: Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard 
IEM 8.2008  Cristina Cattaneo, Matteo Manera and Elisa Scarpa: Industrial Coal Demand in China:  A Provincial Analysis 
IEM 9.2008  Massimiliano Serati, Matteo Manera and Michele Plotegher: Modeling Electricity Prices: From the State of the 
Art to a Draft of a New Proposal 
CCMP 10.2008  Bob van der Zwaan and Reyer Gerlagh: The Economics of Geological CO2 Storage and Leakage 
KTHC 11.2008  Maria Francesca Cracolici and Teodora Erika Uberti: Geographical Distribution of Crime in Italian Provinces: 
A Spatial Econometric Analysis 
KTHC 12.2008  Victor Ginsburgh, Shlomo Weber and Sheila Weyers: Economics of Literary Translation. A Simple Theory and 
Evidence 
NRM 13.2008  Carlo Giupponi, Jaroslav Mysiak and Alessandra Sgobbi: Participatory Modelling and Decision Support for 
Natural Resources Management in Climate Change Research 
NRM 14.2008  Yaella Depietri and Carlo Giupponi: Science-Policy Communication for Improved Water Resources 
Management: Contributions of the Nostrum-DSS Project 
CCMP 15.2008  Valentina Bosetti, Alexander Golub, Anil Markandya, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni: Abatement Cost 
Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Selection under a Stringent Climate Policy. A Dynamic Analysis 
KTHC 16.2008  Francesco D’Amuri, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri: The Labor Market Impact of Immigration in 
Western Germany in the 1990’s 
KTHC 17.2008  Jean Gabszewicz, Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber: Bilingualism and Communicative Benefits 
CCMP 18.2008  Benno Torgler, María A.GarcíaValiñas  and Alison Macintyre: Differences in Preferences Towards the 
Environment: The Impact of a Gender, Age and Parental Effect 
PRCG 19.2008  Gian Luigi Albano and Berardino Cesi: Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model 
of Handicapping 
CTN 20.2008  Pedro Pintassilgo, Michael Finus, Marko Lindroos and Gordon Munro (lxxxiv): Stability and Success of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
CTN 21.2008  Hubert Kempf and Leopold von Thadden (lxxxiv): On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do 
Cooperation and Commitment Matter? 
CTN 22.2008  Markus Kinateder (lxxxiv): Repeated Games Played in a Network 
CTN 23.2008  Taiji Furusawa and Hideo Konishi (lxxxiv): Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby 
Formation 
CTN 24.2008  Paolo Pin, Silvio Franz and Matteo Marsili (lxxxiv): Opportunity and Choice in Social Networks 
CTN 25.2008  Vasileios Zikos (lxxxiv): R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly 
CTN 26.2008  Hans-Peter Weikard and Rob Dellink (lxxxiv): Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate 
Agreements with Renegotiations 
CTN 27.2008  Jingang Zhao (lxxxiv): The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games 
CTN 28.2008  Giacomo Pasini, Paolo Pin and Simon Weidenholzer (lxxxiv): A Network Model of Price Dispersion 
CTN 29.2008  Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote (lxxxiv): Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly 
Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching 
CTN 30.2008  Rahmi İlkiliç (lxxxiv): Network of Commons 
CTN 31.2008  Marco J. van der Leij and I. Sebastian Buhai (lxxxiv): A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation 
CTN 32.2008  Billand Pascal, Frachisse David and Massard Nadine  (lxxxiv): The Sixth Framework Program as an Affiliation 
Network: Representation and Analysis 
CTN 33.2008  Michèle Breton, Lucia Sbragia and Georges Zaccour (lxxxiv): Dynamic Models for International Environmental 
Agreements PRCG 34.2008  Carmine Guerriero: The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States 
IEM 35.2008  Irene Valsecchi: Learning from Experts 
PRCG 36.2008  P. A. Ferrari and S. Salini: Measuring Service Quality: The Opinion of Europeans about Utilities 
ETA 37.2008  Michele Moretto and Gianpaolo Rossini: Vertical Integration and Operational Flexibility 
CCMP 38.2008  William K. Jaeger and Van Kolpin: The Environmental Kuznets Curve from Multiple Perspectives 
PRCG 39.2008  Benno Torgler and Bin Dong: Corruption and Political Interest: Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level 
KTHC 40.2008  Laura Onofri, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, Jasone Cenoz and Durk Gorter: Language Diversity in Urban Landscapes: 
An econometric study 
CTN 41.2008  Michel Le Breton, Valery Makarov, Alexei Savvateev and Shlomo Weber (lxxxiv): Multiple Membership and 
Federal Sructures 
NRM 42.2008  Gideon Kruseman and Lorenzo Pellegrini: Institutions and Forest Management: A Case Study from Swat, 
Pakistan 
SIEV 43.2008  Pietro Caratti and Ludovico Ferraguto: Analysing Regional Sustainability Through a Systemic Approach: The 
Lombardy Case Study 
KTHC 44.2008  Barbara Del Corpo, Ugo Gasparino, Elena Bellini and William Malizia: Effects of Tourism Upon the Economy 
of Small and Medium-Sized European Cities. Cultural Tourists and “The Others” 
CTN 45.2008  Dinko Dimitrov and Emiliya Lazarova: Coalitional Matchings 
ETA 46.2008  Joan Canton, Maia David and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné: Environmental Regulation and Horizontal Mergers 
in the Eco-industry 
ETA 47.2008  Stéphane Hallegatte: A Proposal for a New Prescriptive Discounting Scheme: The Intergenerational Discount 
Rate 
KTHC 48.2008  Angelo Antoci, Paolo Russu and Elisa Ticci: Structural Change, Environment and Well-being: Interactions 
Between Production and Consumption Choices of the Rich and the Poor in Developing Countries 
PRCG 49.2008  Gian Luigi Albano, Federico Dini Roberto Zampino and Marta Fana: The Determinants of Suppliers’ 
Performance in E-Procurement: Evidence from the Italian Government’s E-Procurement Platform 
CCMP 50.2008  Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso: The Impact of Urbanization on CO2 Emissions: Evidence from Developing 
Countries 
KTHC 51.2008  Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli: Managing Migration through Quotas: an Option-theory Perspective 
KTHC 52.2008  Ugo Gasparino, Elena Bellini, Barbara Del Corpo and William Malizia: Measuring the Impact of Tourism 
Upon Urban Economies: A Review of Literature 
ETA 53.2008  Reyer Gerlagh, Snorre Kverndokk and Knut Einar Rosendahl: Linking Environmental and Innovation Policy 
KTHC 54.2008  Oguzhan C. Dincer and Burak Gunalp: Corruption, Income Inequality, and Poverty in the United States 
PRCG 55.2008  Carmine Guerriero: Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and Evidence 
KTHC 56.2008  Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee) and Nilanjana Mitra: Export, Assembly-line FDI or FDI with the Possibility of 
Technology Diffusion: Optimal Entry Mode for Multinationals 
ETA 57.2008  Xavier Pautrel: Environmental Policy, Education and Growth: A Reappraisal when Lifetime Is Finite 
CCMP 58.2008  Natalia Zugravu, Katrin Millock and Gérard Duchene: The Factors Behind CO2 Emission Reduction in 
Transition Economies 
NRM 59.2008  Benno Torgler, María A.García-Valiñas and Alison Macintyre: Justifiability of Littering: An Empirical 
Investigation 
SIEV 60.2008  Paolo Rosato, Anna Alberini, Valentina Zanatta and Margaretha Breil: Redeveloping Derelict and Underused 
Historic City Areas: Evidence from a Survey of Real Estate Developers 
CTN 61.2008  Ricardo Nieva: Networks with Group Counterproposals 
CTN 62.2008  Michael Finus and Dirk T.G. Rübbelke: Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy 
SIEV 63.2008  Elisabetta Strazzera, Elisabetta Cerchi and Silvia Ferrini: A Choice Modelling Approach for Assessment of Use 
and Quasi-Option Values in Urban Planning for Areas of Environmental Interest 
SIEV 64.2008  Paolo Rosato, Lucia Rotaris, Margaretha Breil and Valentina Zanatta: Do We Care about Built Cultural 
Heritage? The Empirical Evidence Based on the Veneto House Market 
KTHC 65.2008  Luca Petruzzellis and Antonia Rosa Guerrieri: Does Network Matter in International Expansion? Evidence from 
Italian SMEs 
NRM 66.2008  Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins: Comparing Price and Non-price Approaches to Urban Water 
Conservation 
CCMP 67.2008  Robert N. Stavins: Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System  
CCMP 68.2008  Geoffrey J. Blanford, Richard G. Richels and Thomas F. Rutherford: Impact of Revised CO2 Growth Projections 
for China on Global Stabilization Goals 
CCMP 69.2008  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Alessandra Sgobbi and Massimo Tavoni: Delayed Action and Uncertain 
Targets. How Much Will Climate Policy Cost? 
CCMP 70.2008  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni: Delayed Participation of Developing  Countries to 
Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed? 
SIEV 71.2008  Massimiliano Mazzanti, Anna Montini and Francesco Nicolli: Embedding Landfill Diversion in Economic, 
Geographical and Policy Settings Panel based evidence from Italy 
ETA 72.2008  Reyer Gerlagh and Matti Liski: Strategic Resource Dependence 
CCMP 73.2008  Sonia Ben Kheder and Natalia Zugravu: The Pollution Haven Hypothesis: A Geographic Economy Model in a 
Comparative Study 
SIEV 74.2008  Jérôme Massiani and Paolo Rosato: The Preferences of Trieste Inhabitants for the Re-use  of the Old Port: A 
Conjoint Choice Experiment 
SIEV 75.2008  Martin F. Quaas and Sjak Smulders: Pollution and the Efficiency of Urban Growth 
CCMP 76.2008  Anil Markandya and Dirk T.G. Rübbelke: Impure Public Technologies and Environmental Policy KTHC 77.2008  Gianmarco I P Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri: Immigration and National Wages: Clarifying the Theory and the 
Empirics 
CCMP 78.2008  Vivekananda Mukherjee, Dirk T.G. Rübbelke and Tilak Sanyal: Technology Transfer in the Non-traded Sector as 
a Means to Combat Global Warming 
SIEV 79.2008  A. Ghermandi, J.C.J.M. van den Bergh, L.M. Brander, H.L.F. de Groot, and P.A.L.D. Nunes: The Economic 
Value of Wetland Conservation and Creation: A Meta-Analysis 
CCMP 80.2008  Snorre Kverndokk and Adam Rose: Equity and Justice in Global Warming Policy 
ETA 81.2008  Sonia Oreffice: Sexual Orientation and Household Decision Making. Same-Sex Couples’ Balance of Power and 
Labor Supply Choices 
CCMP 82.2008  Robert N. Stavins: A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change 
NRM 83.2008  Ruben N. Lubowski, Andrew J. Plantinga and Robert N. Stavins: What Drives Land-Use Change in the United 
States? A National Analysis of Landowner Decisions 
CSRM 84.2008  Forest L. Reinhardt, Robert N. Stavins, and Richard H. K. Vietor: Corporate Social Responsibility Through an 
Economic Lens 
CCMP 85.2008  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Alessandra Sgobbi and Massimo Tavoni: Modelling Economic Impacts of 
Alternative International  Climate Policy Architectures. A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of 
Architectures for Agreement 
PRCG 86.2008  Gian Luigi Albano, Federico Dini and Roberto Zampino: Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the 
Acquisitions of IT Services 
SIEV 87.2008  Dennis Guignet and Anna Alberini: Voluntary Cleanups and Redevelopment Potential: Lessons from Baltimore, 
Maryland 
IEM 88.2008  Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet
  and Philippe Quirion: Efficiency and Distributional Impacts of Tradable White 
Certificates Compared to Taxes, Subsidies and Regulations 
CCMP 89.2008  Damien Demailly and Philippe Quirion: Changing the Allocation Rules in the EU ETS: Impact on 
Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency 
CCMP 90.2008  Judson Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins: Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy 
Architecture 
SIEV 91.2008  Silvio Giove, Paolo Rosato and Margaretha Breil: A Multicriteria Approach for the Evaluation of the 
Sustainability of Re-use of Historic Buildings in Venice 
CCMP 92.2008  Corrado Di Maria, Sjak Smulders and Edwin van derWerf: Absolute Abundance and Relative Scarcity: 
Announced Policy, Resource Extraction, and Carbon Emissions 
CCMP 93.2008  Dirk T.G. Rübbelke and Nathan Rive: Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate Protection
SIEV 94.2008  Massimiliano Mazzanti and Roberto Zoboli: Waste Generation, Incineration and Landfill Diversion. De-
coupling Trends, Socio-Economic Drivers and Policy Effectiveness in the EU 
CCMP 95.2008  Benno Torgler, María A.García Valiñas and Alison Macintyre: Environmental Participation and Environmental 
Motivation 
CCMP 96.2008  Geoffrey Heal and Nori Tarui: Technology Diffusion, Abatement Cost, and Transboundary Pollution 





(lxxxiv) This paper was presented at the 13th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by the 






  2008 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Matteo Manera) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Giulio Sapelli) 
  PRCG  Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 
 
 